|
Our mechanism's effectivity is inside a constant fraction of the a posteriori optimally environment friendly solution. Our mechanism's technical core is a variant of the online weighted bipartite matching problem the place unlike prior variants by which one randomizes edge arrivals or bounds edge weights, we could revoke beforehand dedicated edges. Further, it bounds the earnings of speculators who're in the game to obtain the cancellation charges. Our model permits the vendor to cancel at any time any reservation made earlier, in which case the holder of the reservation incurs a utility loss amounting to a fraction of her worth for the reservation and can also receive a cancellation price from the seller. They still hold if we replace objects with elements of a matroid and matchings with impartial sets, or if all bidders have additive worth for a set of gadgets. A seller will display a set of slots in some unspecified time in the future T in the future. Many advertisers (bidders) use Internet programs to purchase show advertisements on publishers鈥 |
|